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Abstract of thesis entitled: 
This thesis studies the profitability of the horizontal merger in the bargaining 
and matching model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). The horizontal 
merger is added as an extra stage before the bargaining game, when a number 
of agents may choose to merge into one. The bargaining and matching is 
assumed to last infinitely. Each agent is assumed to be replaced after each 
successful transaction, and we consider the stream of expected payoff of a sub-
population (namely, a village) instead of a one-shot payoff of a single agent 
in the original model. There exist initial market configurations that support 
profitable mergers; and the monopoly merger induces maximum gain in the 
joint expected profit of the merged parties, regardless whether the merger size 
is determined exogenously or endogenously. However, the industry optimal 
merger is the kink, which equalizes the numbers of the two types of agents. 
The model is extended by allowing multiple numbers of merged groups with 
the same size. In such cases, the dominant endogenous merger is no longer the 
monopoly merger; instead it is the kink, which is also the industry optimal 
one. Finally, the monopoly merger does not prevail when the horizontal 
merger takes place in both types of agents sequentially. 
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I Introduction 
There are many cases of mergers wherein the merging parties gain market 
power through the merger. They can be simply divided into two types: the 
demand side and the supply side. A collective bulk purchase by a group of 
consumers can usually obtain a great discount from a retailer or the original 
supplier. This case can be referred to as a demand side merger. Although 
the case can be interpreted in the pricing sense that bulk purchase saves 
the administration (institutional) cost of the seller; thus, the discount is, in 
fact , a rebate of the saving. Sometimes, suppliers can merge together and 
gain marker power. The most representative case is the function of a labour 
union in wage negotiation. Labour union unites all or most of the workers 
of a specific industry to gather greater bargaining power when confronting 
the employers in labour related-matters. Another example is the emergence 
of online advertising agencies that obtain exclusive advertising rights from a 
number of web portals. After sorting them into different groups according to 
their content nature, these agencies contact advertisers for their business. As 
the agency claims that the advertisement can reach the target web surfers , 
it is more likely to make more business or more revenues. A merger creates 
incentives for parties to merge. 
In theory, a merger does not always produce gain to the merged party as 
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a whole. Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) 1 conducted a welfare analysis 
of a horizontal merger in Cournot model of oligopoly ( 1838). Some firms 
are merged into one firm by exogenous means. They showed that in the 
Cournot's oligopoly setting, by comparing the joint profit of the insider firms 
before and after the horizontal merger, not all mergers of firms are profitable, 
unless the merger approaches to becoming a monopoly. They claimed that a 
merger is sufficient to be unprofitable when less than 80 percent of the firms 
collude. 
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of a profitable horizontal 
merger in a bargaining setting. Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) 2 constructed 
bargaining models, which the sizes of the population of the two sides deter-
mine the equilibrium partition. R&W deduced a semi-stationary market 
equilibrium in a bargaining model with random matching of the bargaining 
parties. In every period, each agent has a positive probability to be matched 
with a new partner of the opposite type. The matching technology is assumed 
to be in terms of the population sizes of the two types of agents. After the 
matching process , agents with a partner will undergo the bargaining process. 
Each agent from a pair has a half chance to be the proposer in the bargaining, 
or a half chance to be the respondent to the proposer 's offer. If there is a 
1 Herein referred to as S-S-R. 
2 Herein referred to as R& W. 
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disagreement, the pair will go to the next cycle of matching and bargaining 
process. If there is an agreement, the two parties of the bargaining receive 
the agreed partition and leave the market for good. Any exit of agents is re-
plenished by new agents in the same number. The number of agents existing 
in every period is fixed; thus, the game is considered to be in steady state, 
and the matching technology is also fixed over time. The authors introduced 
a semi-stationary strategy to support the market equilibrium. An agent who 
adopts the semi-stationary strategy applies one set of strategy towards any 
agent regardless of any history. They showed that the equilibrium partition 
is determined by the common discount factor and the matching technology. 
Note that the matching technology depends on the population sizes of the 
two types of agents. As a result, when all agents are assumed to be perfectly 
patient, the equilibrium partition can be directly expressed in terms of the 
population sizes.3 The authors thus observed that the agent from the rela-
tive minority type would receive more from a successful bargaining. Agents 
can gain more from a bargaining if they are allowed to execute the horizon-
tal merger, which turns them from the relative majority into the relative 
minority. 
We integrate the horizontal merger as an extra stage before the very 
3In market equilibrium, if all agents are infinitely patient, a type 1 agent receives 
x* = (N1~2N2 ) from a successful bargaining, and her partner, a type 2 agent, receives what 
remains. 
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beginning of R&W's matching and bargaining game, and then we investigate 
the existence of a profitable horizontal merger using techniques similar to 
those of S-8-R. There are two types of agents representing the two sides of 
a market. Each agent is assumed to be the representative of the interest of 
a sub-population (village) of the same type; thus, we consider the payoff as 
a stream of income of the sub-population instead of a one-shot payoff of an 
individual agent. The horizontal merger with a merger size M + 1 refers to 
the event that M + 1 type 1 agents cluster together to form a single identity 
to exist in every period. The alternative interpretation is that a leading 
type 1 village is assigned the right to select M other type 1 villages to join 
the merged group. We then construct a function to express the gain to the 
merged group due to the horizontal merger. By studying the characteristics 
of the gain function, we observe that the monopoly merger, wherein all the 
sub-populations merge into a single identity, maximizes the gain if profitable 
merger size(s) exists. No merger is preferred to any merger if there is no 
profitable merger size. This prime proposition still holds when the leading 
village can choose the merger size as it desires and splits the gain equally 
among all the villages in the merged group. 
Afterwards, we give two corollaries. In the first corollary, we show that if 
the horizontal merger does not turn the majority into the minority, it cannot 
be profitable. However , if it does, there exists an industry size such that the 
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merged group starts making gain from it, in contrast with the result from 
S-S-R.4 The second corollary shows that when the initial number of both 
types of agents are equal, no profitable horizontal merger exists. Hence, we 
make a policy implication that the governing body should impose a limit 
to the degree of horizontal merger, such that the industry surpluses of both 
types are not reduced and becomes equalized. Moreover, when we studied 
the choice of the merger size and the industry surplus of the merging type of 
villages, we discovered that the industry optimal merger size reconciles with 
the limit. 
There are two extensions to the main model. In the first extension, we 
consider that the merger occurs sequentially in both types. In the first stage, 
the leading type 1 village decides the merger size of her merged group. In the 
second stage, the leading type 2 village chooses the merger size in response 
to the events in the first stage. Using the proposition of the main model, we 
found a unique equilibrium for this revised model through a simple backward 
induction. The equilibrium implies that the first-mover, the type 1 village, 
chooses a marginal merger size such that the second-mover does not have the 
incentive to conduct a merger, provided that the former merger is profitable. 
Otherwise, nobody would be willing to conduct a merger. In the second 
4 They proved that there exists an industry size for the merger that causes losses in the 
Cournot model, given any degree of merger. 
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extension, we consider the common-size horizontal merger, which results a 
number of merged groups with the same size. Following the convention of S-
S-R, the profit-maximizing common-size merger is not always the monopoly 
merger. There are cases wherein the profit-maximizing common merger size is 
between the monopoly one and the kink, which results the remaining number 
of villages equaling the number of villages of the opposing type. Furthermore, 
if the gain is assumed to be equally shared among the members of each merged 
group, the share-maximizing common merger size is the kink. The industry 
optimal common merge size is the kink as well. 
In section II, we outline the model setting of the bargaining and match-
ing game of R&W. In section Ill, we discuss how to integrate the horizontal 
merger into R&W's model, and give a number of numerical examples to 
demonstration the profitability of the horizontal merger. Section IV contains 
the analysis of the main model described in the previous two sections, and 
it will be presented in three parts. The analysis in the first part follows the 
convention of S-S-R. The second part assumes that the choice of merger size 
is determined endogenously. The third part considers the impact of the hori-
zontal merger on the industry surplus of the merging type of villages. Section 
V discusses two extensions of the model. The first sub-section discusses the 
two-stage sequential horizontal merger, while the second sub-section gives the 
analysis of the common-size horizontal merger, with a methodology similar 
6 
to that in section IV. Section VI presents the discussion. 
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11 Bargaining with Matching 
In this section, we describe the model setting of R&W's bargaining model. 
There are two types of agents, which are numbered as i == {1, 2}. Type i 
agents are populated with Ni agents; and they are assumed to be homogenous 
if they are of the same type. At the beginning of each time period, an agent 
is matched with a partner of the other type according to a random matching 
process. They then bargain over the partition of a unit surplus. If there is a 
mutual agreement , the respective pair of agents must leave the market and 
be replaced by new agents from their respective types in equal number as the 
departure. Time is considered as discrete and infinite. The matching process 
causes no time lapse, but the bargaining process does. The discount factor 
for a period is 6 < 1. 
The matching of a pair of agents is determined by a random matching 
process. The probability that a type 1 (2) agent is matched with a new 
type 2 (1) agent (in the other words , a partner) is a ({3). For an agent, a 
new partner refers to an agent of the opposite type, whom the former agent 
have not met and conducted a bargaining with in the previous period. The 
parameter a and {3 are functions of N1 and N2 . 5 The departure of a pair of 
5 In Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), the explicit forms of a and f3 were not defined 
in the deduction of equilibrium, but were given in the latter discussion section, where the 
equilibrium partition are expressed in terms of N 1 and N 2 with an assumption that all 
agents are infinitely patient. 
8 
agents is replaced by another pair; thus, the parameters a and (3 are assumed 
to be fixed over time. 
In the bargaining process, the role of the proposer is assigned randomly 
among the matched pair of agents: each agent of a matched pair has a 50 
percent chance of being a proposer in the bargaining of the period. The 
proposer offers a partition to her partner, and the latter decides whether to 
accept the former's offer. If the responder agrees, the pair receives the agreed 
partition and leaves the market, and will be replaced by a new pair. If the 
responder disagrees, the pair remains in the market and becomes involved 
in the matching process of the next period. An agent who cannot make 
a successful bargaining in a period has four possible outcomes in the next 
period: i) she and her old partner is each matched with a new partner; ii) 
she is matched with a new partner but her old partner does not; iii) she is 
not matched with a new partner but her old partner does ; and iv) neither 
of them are matched with a new partner. Cases i, ii, and iii imply that the 
bargaining between the pair is broken, but case iv implies that the bargaining 
still continues. The former agent starts a new bargaining with a new partner 
in cases i and ii , but she is left unmatched in case iii. The probabilities of 
each case occurring are a (3, a(1- j3), (1-a)J), and (1-a)(1- j3), respectively. 
Each agent aims to maximize her own expected time-dependent util-
ity,wherein 0 < 6 < 1 is the discount factor. If an agent meets an agreement 
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at time t and receives a fraction of x of a unit surplus, the agent is indifferent 
between the utility generated from this event and the utility of 6tx received 
in period 0. A perpetual disagreement will create zero utility to the agent. 
It is assumed that each agent has perfect recall of the histories at any 
period. Let H~ be the set of all possible histories that end with the sce-
nario wherein the type i agent is selected to be the proposer at period T. 
Furthermore, let H};_i be that wherein the type i agent receives the offer and 
responds. 
The proposer proposes a unit surplus in the form of (x, 1- x), where the 
former number is the share of the buyer and the latter is that of the seller. 
The model is in extensive form; thus, the strategy of a buyer, f E S1 , is 
expressed as a sequence of decision rules: f = (Jt)~0 . Note that function ft 
is history-dependent. If ht E H~, ft(ht) E [0 , 1]; if ht E H};_i, ft(ht) E {Y, N}. 
The strategy of a seller, g E S2 , can be similarly deduced by the analogy. 
The concept of a semi-stationary strategy is defined and applied in R&W's 
paper. An agent who applies the semi-stationary strategy adopts a single 
strategy regardless of who the partner she would face, the number of periods 
passed, and the unsuccessful bargaining process she experienced. In mathe-
matical expression: there are two set of histories, h t and h t' , which refer to 
the same ending event that the agent has just met a new partner. A semi-
stationary strategy, f E si ' is such that jT(hT) = jT' (hT') , given any two 
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histories hT and hT' (T- t = T'- t'), where the events occurring between ht 
and hT and those between ht' and hT' are identical. 
R&W proposed that the semi-stationary strategy constitutes a unique 
market equilibrium for the bargaining model described above. The market 
equilibrium suggests that an agent should propose an offer that is a function 
of a and f3 or accept the equilibrium offer if she is the responder. The 
mathematical expression of the market equilibrium is as follows: 
where 
X *= 








2(1- 6) + 6a- 6(1- 6)(1- a)(1- (3 ) 
2(1 - (3 ) + 6a + 6(3 
6a + (1- 6)6(1- a)(1- (3 ) 
y* = 2(1 - (3 ) + 6a + 6(3 
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If there is an opportunity that a type i == { 1, 2} agent can enter the 
market with a price, she should be willing to pay the following: 
The solution can be simpler and intuitive when we impose stricter as-
sumptions, as discussed in R&W's paper. If we assume that all agents are 
perfectly patient (or , in the other words, 8 --7 1), the market equilibrium 
partition can be simplified as 
(1) 
Equation 1 implies that the market equilibrium partition depends on the 
relative sizes of a and {3 . This means that the probability that an agent 
is matched with a new partner after an agreement affects the market equi-
librium partition. Note that a and f3 are assumed to be a function of N1 
and N2 , which are the population sizes of the two types of agents. R&W 
defined the explicit forms of a and f3, and substituted them into equation 1 
as follows. 
12 
define a == ~, f3 == ~ ,6 and substitute them into Equation 1 as 
(2) 
Through these two assumptions, we can see that the relative sizes of the 
populations of the two types of agents determine the market equilibrium 
partition. An agent who belongs to the relative minority type earns more 
from the market equilibrium bargaining result. Thus , there are incentives 
for the agents from the same type to merge together, such that the agents of 
their type can gain the relative minority in the bargaining process. In this 
paper, we further define the bargaining model of R&W in a way that would 
allow the possibility of a horizontal merger in one of the two types of agents. 
Later, we will release the assumption of unilaterality of the horizontal merger 
into bilaterality. 
6 K is the fixed per period overall rate of meeting, which is defined as k1 N 1 + k2 N 2 . 
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Ill Horizontal Merger 
In this section, we consider the case of a single-side horizontal merger , wherein 
we allow the horizontal merger to occur among one type of agents only. 
We assume that the horizontal merger occurs among type 1 agents , unless 
otherwise specified. The horizontal merger in this model is very similar to 
that in S-S-R. There are (M+ 1) type 1 agents merging into a single identity 
to exist in every period. We compare the joint profit of the merged agents 
when there is a horizontal merger and that when the merged agents each acts 
as a single identity. 
In the original model of R&W, all agents of a type come from the same 
population. In the other words , the departure of a type 1 agent from the 
market is replaced by another agent who comes from the population of type 
1 agents . However, in this paper, we divide the whole population of a type 
of agents into a number of sub-populations. Each sub-population is called 
a "village". At the beginning of the game, each village sends a villager to 
represent the interest of the village. The villager represents her village in 
the matching and bargaining process. As a result , as will the original model 
of R&W, there are N1 type 1 agents and N2 type 2 agents in every period. 
However , with regard to this paper, there are N1 type 1 villagers and N2 
type 2 villagers in every period. 
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The relationship between a village and its fellow villagers can be inter-
preted as the relationship between a company and its managers or business 
representatives respectively. The business representative searches for new 
business deal for her company. This process can be said that is modelled as 
the matching process of R&W's model. Moreover, the replacement of new 
villagers after a successful bargaining can be said as the business relationship 
of two companies , which each is in different types, cools off for a period of 
time, since the deal just made takes time to be finished. Another straight-
forward interpretation of the replacement is simply a replacement for another 
business representative to prevent corruption. 
The horizontal merger among villages (sub-populations) of the same type 
can be interpreted into a number of ways. One way is to simply view it 
as the merger between a number of sub-populations, such that the income 
streams of the number of sub-population are merged into one. Another way 
of interpreting this is that the proposer of the horizontal merger pays the 
agreed sub-populations to leave the whole population and the market for 
good. In every period , compensations are paid to the sub-populations that 
agree to stay out of the market. 7 
We believe that the introduction of this amendment to R& W 's model does 
7 The sum of the corn pensations can be a portion of or the full amount of the gain in 
the joint profit due to the horizontal merger and is subject to negotiation. 
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not affect the market equilibrium, which is used extensively in this paper. 
First , we consider the case that the horizontal merger is unilateral. A type 
2 agent who comes from the population with no horizontal merger has to 
leave the market and be replaced by a new type 2 agent after a successful 
bargaining. Hence, a type 1 village plays a one-shot game in periods when 
her representative, a villager, is matched with a partner and then conducts 
a successful bargaining at once according to the market equilibrium. As a 
type 1 village cannot maintain a multi-period relationship with the same 
type 2 agent after a transaction, the game form is not in the repeated game 
setting. The market equilibrium also does not change when the game allows a 
horizontal merger in both types , provided that all villagers have no knowledge 
about the "nationality" of their partners. 
In the following , the horizontal merger with a size of (M + 1) means that 
there are (M + 1) villages merging into a single identity,8 such that there 
are N{ = N 1 - M type 1 agents existing in every period instead of N 1 . The 
reason that the size of the horizontal merger takes the form of (M + 1) is for 
the sake of simplicity in the latter mathematical deduction. Thus , it can be 
said that a single village (the leading village) is granted the right to initialize 
the horizontal merger, and she can invite M other villages to join the merged 
8 In the main model, we assume that there exists only one merged group. In the 
extension section, we allow a number of merged groups with equal merger sizes . 
16 
group. In order to ensure the horizontal merger becomes profitable, N1 is 
assumed to be larger than N2 . We maintain the assumption that all agents 
are perfectly patient. 
As an analogy to the terminology of S-S-R , we let IIf ( N1 , M + 1, N2 ) be 
the expected joint profit per period of the merged group subsequent to the 
merger if there are (M+ 1) villages that agree to merge into a single identity, 
given that there are N1 type 1 villagers and N2 type 2 agents in every period 
originally; II{"0 (N1 , M + 1, N2) be the expected joint profit per period of 
the merged group if the (M + 1) villages each acts as a separate identity in 
every period (or, in the other words , if there is no horizontal merger); and 
G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) be the gain in the expected joint profit from the horizontal 





(N~M)Vl((Nl- M),N2), if N{ > N2 
N1 > N2 > 0, ME [0, N1 - 1] and N{ = N1 - M. 
if N{ < N2 
(3) 
As the number of type 1 villagers existing in every period is reduced 
from N 1 to N{ = N1 - M if there is a horizontal merger with merger size of 
(M+ 1), the merged group can earn V1 ((N1 - M),N2 ) if it can be matched 
with a type 2 agent, conduct a successful bargaining, and then receive the 
market equilibrium partition at once. However, the merged group may not 
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be lucky enough to be matched with a new partner in every period. We 
assume that each type 1 villager has the probability a = min(Z~ 'N2 ) = ~~ to 
be matched with a type 2 villager. 9 Therefore, if the remaining number of 
type 1 villages after the merger at least equals the number of type 2 villages 
(or N{ > N2), the merged group has N;r_:_M probability to be matched with 
a type 2 villager in each period, and the expected joint profit per period of 
villages after the merger is smaller than the number of type 2 villages (or 
N{ < N2) , the merged group and the other villagers must meet a partner, 
so they can each earn the market equilibrium partition ( N1 -~+N2 ) in every 
period. 
If there is no horizontal merger, the expected joint profit per period of 
the merged group with a merger size of (M+ 1) is simply the merger size 
(M + 1) times the probability ~~ and times the original market equilibrium 
Here, we give a few numerical examples. We initially start with the 
market structure with three type 1 agents (villagers) and two type 2 agents in 
every period. There are three possible horizontal merger sizes: 1 (no merger) , 
2, and 3, or M = {0, 1, 2}. Each village is supposed to earn 3~2 = ~ in a 
9 In this paper , the matching technology K is defined as min(N1 , N 2 ). It does not affect 
the market equilibrium given in the paper of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) . 
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period if the representative villager is matched with a type 2 agent. Instead, 
if there is a horizontal merger with M = {0, 1, 2}, each villager, either of 
the merged group or of the non-merged villages, can obtain ( 3 -~)+2 = ~ ' 
(3- i)+2 = ~ and ( 3 -~)+2 = ~, respectively. Furthermore, the probability that 
a type 1 villager, either of the merged group or of the non-merged villages , 
is matched with a partner (type 2 agent) in a period is ~ , 3.:_ 1 = 1, and 1, 
respectively. The gain in the expected joint profit of the merged group from 
the horizontal merger with a size of (M+ 1) in each period, G 1 ( N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) , 
are: G1 (3 , 1, 2) = 0, G1 (3 , 2, 2) = - 310 , and G1 (3 , 3, 2) = - 125 . We can see 
that any horizontal merger is not profitable when the initial market structure 
has three type 1 villagers and two type 2 agents. 
The result becomes different if an extra village is added. Initially, if 
there are four type 1 agents (villages) and two type 2 agents in every pe-
riod, the gain in the expected joint profit of the merged group with different 
possible merger sizes in each period are G1 ( 4, 1, 2) = 0, G1 ( 4, 2, 2) = - 115 , 
G1 ( 4, 3, 2) = 0, and G1 ( 4, 4, 2) = 0. We can see that the horizontal merger 
with a merger size of 3 and 4 (or M= 2 and M= 3, respectively) produce 
neither profit nor loss to the merged group, although that with a merger size 
of 2 produces loss. 
If there are more villages participating in the market , more profitable 
mergers are likely to exist. For a market initially with five villages and 
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two type 2 agents in every period, the gain in the expected joint profit of 
the merged group under different possible merger sizes in each period are 
G 1 ( 5, 1, 2) = 0, G 1 ( 5, 2, 2) = - 2~30 , G 1 ( 5, 3, 2) = - 1 ~5 , G 1 ( 5, 4, 2) = 730 , and 
G1 (5 , 5, 2) = 221 • This example shows that horizontal mergers can generate 
surplus to the merged group. 
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IV Analysis 
IV .1 Existence of Profitable Merger 
Below, we deduce a number of notable properties of the bargaining game us-
ing the single-side horizontal merger, the setting of which has been discussed 
in the previous section. 
The most notable question that should be asked is the profitability of 
the horizontal merger with different merger sizes. This can be answered by 
comparing the values of the gain function with each possible merger size. 
The gain function has been explicitly defined in the previous section, and it 
has three variables: N1 , N2 , and M. N1 and N2 are state variables; M is 
the only independent variable. Therefore, the properties of the gain function 
can be observed by sketching its graph. 
The prime property is as follows: 
Proposition 1 If the initial market configuration (N1 , N2) supports prof-
itable horizontal merger{s) {positive G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) for several values of 
M) 7 the profit-maximizing merger size is the initial number of type 1 villages 
N1. 
Proposition 1 implies that if the initial market structure can sustain a prof-
itable horizontal merger(s) for some values of M , the monopoly merger, which 
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all type 1 villages surrender their identities and merge into a single identity, 
generates the maximum amount of expected gain per period to the merged 
group. 
The proof of proposition 1 takes six parts. Lemma 1 verifies the convexity 
of the gain function. Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 check the properties of three special 
points: M= 0 (no merger), M= NI- N2 (the kink), and M= NI- 1 (the 
monopoly merger). They are worthwhile to be studied because they provide 
stationary points to sketch the curve of the gain function, as M = 0 and 
M = NI - 1 are the lower and upper limits of the independent variable M , 
respectively, and the kink M = NI- N2 connects the two segments of the gain 
functions ME [0 , (NI- N2)] and ME [(NI- N2), (NI- 1)]. Moreover, due 
to the convexity of the gain function, these three special points are also the 
probable local maximum. We found conditions to guarantee the latter two 
to generate positive gain, which means that the probable candidates of the 
local maximum are restricted into two if both conditions hold. Finally, we 
make two claims to prove that the kink can never be the profit-maximizing 
merger size, and there is only one condition required to make the monopoly 
merger be the profit-maximizing merger. Otherwise, the profit-maximizing 
merger s1ze 1s zero. 
Below are the required Lemmas and Claims to prove Proposition 1. Steps 
omitted are shown in the appendix. 
23 
Proof. Find the first and second derivatives of G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N 2 ) with 
respect to M. 
8G1(N1, M+ 1, N2) 
8M 
82G1(N1, M+ 1, N2) 
8M2 
82G1(N1 ,M + l ,N2) > Q • 
8M2 . 
if N{ < N2 
(4) 
if N{ < N2 
(5) 
Although Lemma 1 shows that the second derivative of G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N 2 ) 
with respect to M is negative, we cannot conclude that G 1 (N1 , M+ 1, N 2 ) 
is a convex function with respect to M. It is because there exists a kink 
(at M = N 1 - N 2 ) in all possible values of M. Instead, we can say that 
G1 (N1, M+ 1, N2) is a convex function when the domain of M is [0 , (N1 - N2)] 
In the following several lemmas, we describe the properties of G1 (N1 , M+ 
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1, N2) at three special values of M: 0 (no merger), (NI - N2) (the kink) , and 
(NI - 1) (the monopoly merger). 
Proof. Substitute M = 0 into Equation 3 and 4. • 
It is trivial to see from Lemma 2 part (i) that there will neither be gain 
nor loss if there is no horizontal merger, that is, if the merger size is 1. 
Lemma 2 part ( ii) shows that the horizontal merger may cause loss to the 
merged group. The claims of Lemma 2 part (i) and (ii) are analogous to 
the property A and B of S-S-R. However, it is inconclusive to make the 
claim that all horizontal mergers with any merger size are unprofitable. In 
the following lemma, we will show that there is a condition that guarantees 
the profitability of the monopoly merger, in which all villages are merged 
together as one body. 
Lemma 3 The horizontal merger that creates a monopoly is profitable if and 
only if NI> Ni. 
Proof. The monopoly merger implies M = NI - 1. Substitute it into 




Lemma 3 shows that the initial number of type 1 villages must be N2 ( N2 - 1) 
larger than the number of type 2 agents , such that the monopoly merger is 
profitable. To demonstrate, if there are four type 2 agents in every pe-
riod, there should be at least 17 > 16 = 4 2 = Ni type 1 villages so that 
the monopoly merger generates positive gain in the expected joint profit: 
G1 (15 , 15, 4) = - 9~, G1 (16 , 16, 4) = 0, G1 (17, 17, 4) = 1~5 . 
We ascertained that the monopoly merger is profitable if condition 6 
holds. Next, we will study the happenings at the kink. 
Lemma 4 {i) if condition 6 holds, lim 801 (N~:+l ,N2 ) I > O; 
M > Nl-N2 M=Nl-N2 
Proof. For part (i) , substitute M= N 1 - N 2 into Equation 4. 
irrelevant to the proof, if N{ > N 2 
0. 
For part (ii), substitute the kink M = N1 - N2 into Equation 3. 
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Let N1 = nN2 , and substitute it into Equation 7. 
Differentiate Equation 8 with respect to n. 10 
oG1 (nN2 , (n- 1)N2 + 1, N2) 
on 
Set equation 8 > 0. 
1 1 1 
G 1 (nN2 , (n- 1)N2 + 1, N2) = -- ((n - 1)N2 + 1)(- )( ) > 0 2 n n + 1 
10 Note that n > 1 as N1 > N 2. Thus, G1 (nN2, (n- 1)N2 + 1, N2)ln=l = ~- ~ = 0, 




Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 provide the properties of the three special points , 
and Lemma 1 gives the convexity of the gain function in the interval M E 
[0 , (N1 - N2)] and M E [(N1 - N2) , (N1 - 1)]. Thus, the curve of G 1 (N1 , M+ 
1, N2 ) can be plotted. Below are the two claims constituting Proposition 1. 
Claim 1 If condition 6 is satisfied, the profit-maximizing merger size is the 
initial number of type 1 villages N 1 . 
Proof. We can see that the plot of the gain function G 1 ( N 1 , M + 1, N2 ) 
against M starts at 0 by Lemma 2, and it is a convex function in the interval 
M E [0 , (N1 - N2)] and M E [(N1- N2) , (N1 - 1)] by Lemma 1. Condi-
tion 6 guarantees G 1 (N1, N 1 , N2) > 0 by Lemma 3, and G 1 (N1 , N 1 , N2) > 
G1 (N1 , (N1 - N2) + 1, N2) by Lemma 4 (i). To conclude, the unique local 
maximum over all possible values of M (E [0 , (N1 - 1)]) is at M= N 1 - 1 . 
• 
Claim 1 shows that if the initial number of type 1 villages reaches a 
point supporting a profitable monopoly merger, the monopoly merger max-
imizes the gain in the expected joint profit of the merged group per period, 
G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2). The next question one would raise then is what the 
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profit-maximizing merger size is when condition 6 does not hold. In the fol-
lowing claim, we will prove that the profit-maximizing merger size is 0 when 
condition 6 is dropped. 
Claim 2 If condition 6 does not hold, there is no profitable horizontal merger. 
The profit-maximizing merger size is M = 0. 
Proof. Due to the convexity of the gain function G1 (NI? M+ 1, N2 ), the can-
didates of the local maximum over all possible values of M ( E [0 , (N1 - 1)]) 
are at M = 0, M= N 1 - N2 and M= N 1 - 1. Since condition 6 does not 
hold, the value of the gain function at M = N1 - 1 cannot be the sole local 
maximum because G1 (N1 , 0 + 1,N2 ) = 0 > G1(N1 ,Nl?N2)· Therefore, by 
Lemma 4 (ii) , the value of the gain function at M = N1 - N2 (the kink) 
is the sole local maximum if and only if the initial number of type 1 vil-
lages N1 > 2(N2 - 1)N2. However, the non-existence of condition 6 implies 
the non-existence of condition 9. This is because N:j > 2(N2 - 1)N2 if and 
only if N2 < 2. Moreover, for N2 = 1, Ni, = 1, and 2(N2 - 1)N2 = 0 but 
N1 > N2 > 0. To conclude, M = 0 will be the only possibility to be the 
unique local maximum. • 
The combination of Claim 1 and 2 implies proposition 1. It is because 
condition 6 is the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a 
profitable horizontal merger(s). As illustrated in all the proofs above, there 
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are only three possibilities for the local maximum over M E [0, (NI - 1)]: 
M == 0 (no merger), M == NI - N2 (the kink), and M == NI - 1 (the monopoly 
merger). The graph of the gain function GI (NI, M + 1, N2 ) is decreasing at 
M== 0 (Lemma 2 (ii)); thus, it is impossible for a local maximum to exist 
in the range of M E (0 , NI - N2). If condition 6 holds, all values of the 
gain function for M E ((NI- N2 ) , (NI- 1)] must be larger than that at 
M == NI - N2 (Lemma 4 (ii)) , and its value at M == NI - 1 is positive 
(Lemma 3). Thus, by the convexity of the gain function (Lemma 1) , we 
can conclude that there is a unique local maximum at M == NI - 1 when 
NI > N:j. If condition 6 does not hold, the local maximum should not be at 
ME ((NI- N2 ) , (NI- 1)], but it can be either at M== 0 or M== NI- N2 
due to the convexity of the gain function. The value of the gain function at 
M == NI - N2 is the unique local maximum if it is larger than zero, where 
NI > 2(N2 - 1)N2 is the necessary and sufficient condition. However, the 
condition does not hold because condition 6 is assumed to be not satisfied. 
Hence, the unique local maximum is at M == 0 when NI < N:j. 
[insert figure 1] 
[insert figure 2] 
Proposition 1 requires the initial population of the merging type should 
be substantially larger than that of the minority type. Figures 1 and 2 show 
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the gain function and its components with different N1 , but with the same 
N2 , which is 8. Therefore, the initial number of type 1 villages should be 
larger than 64 (= 82) , such that profitable merger(s) exists. This is shown in 
Figure 1. In addition, the profit-maximizing merger is the monopoly merger. 
However, if condition 6 is not satisfied, no merger is profitable, and this is 
shown in Figure 2. 
Based on Proposition 1, we develop two corollaries. The first corollary 
connects the scale of the horizontal merger and the initial number of sub-
population N1 . The second corollary deals with the anti-trust limitation on 
the scale of the horizontal merger and the total (industry) surplus of the 
whole society, for both types altogether. 
Corollary 1 If the initial market configuration ( N1 , N2) supports profitable 
horizontal merger(s), a horizontal merger does not maximize profit if the 
remaining number of villages N{ is still larger than the number of type 2 
agents. 
Proof. There are two ways to prove the Corollary: 
( i) by Proposition 1. 
(ii) Let M= ()Nl ~ 1, and R = rrnJlf~ · A~t~\ , where () E (0 , 1). 





For any horizontal merger with a merger fraction e such that N{ > N2 , 
there exist an initial number of villages for the horizontal merger to inflict 
loss to the merged group. For the set of merger fraction e that gives N{ < N2 , 
there exists a subset of e such that lim R == N ell-e) > 1 given a finite N2. 
N1-----?oo 2 
Furthermore, there exists a set of villages N1 with respect to each element of 
the subset of e, such that the respective merger is profitable. • 
S-S-R showed that in Cournot 's oligopoly model , there is an industry size 
large enough to incur losses to the merged group for a given merger fraction 
a < 1. In this paper, we apply the same technique, and show the same result 
if the scale of the horizontal merger is too small. However, if the merger size 
is larger enough such that the number of remaining villagers who exist in 
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each period is effectively smaller11 than the number of type 2 agents , there 
exist a number of initial type 1 villages ( N1 ) such that the respective merger 
makes , in contrast, a gain in the expected joint profit of the merged group. 
Corollary 2 If the number of type 1 agents and the number of type 2 agents 
existing in each period are the same initiallyi any horizontal merger is not 
pro fit able. 
Proof. There are two ways to prove the corollary. 
( i) We assume that the initial number of type 1 villages equals the number 
of type 2 agents (that means N1 == N2 ); thus , condition 6 is not satisfied. 






11 Effectively smaller means that a merger fraction is in a set of e, which is large enough 
to satisfy lim R = N ell - e) > 1, or e(I~e) > N2. 
N 1 --+oo 2 
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(12) 
Initially, the number of type 1 villages is assumed to be equivalent to the 
number of type 2 agents. We show that the merged group makes neither 
gain nor loss if the horizontal merger size is 1 (equation 10) and makes a 
loss if there is monopoly merger (equation 11). As the first derivative of 
GI(NI, M+ 1, NI) (equation 12) is negative for all M, there is no horizontal 
merger generating positive GI (N1, M+ 1, NI)· • 
Corollary 2 has a strong policy implication in the welfare analysis of the 
horizontal merger. From Proposition 1, we see that the profit-maximizing 
merger size is the total number of sub-population NI, that is the monopoly 
merger. As a result, the number of transactions made in each period would 
be sharply reduced from min(NI, N2 ) = N2 to only one. This is clearly not 
efficient. To avoid this worst case scenario, the governing body can set a 
maximal level of horizontal merger. By Corollary 2, we propose that the 
maximal level should be a merger size that results the remaining number of 
type 1 villages after the horizontal merger equaling the number of type 2 
agents existing in each period. That is, M= NI - N2 . The total (industry) 
surplus of the whole society does not change as the total number of bargaining 
agreement met in each period remains to be min(NI, N2 ) = N2 . Moreover, 
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the income distribution becomes more even because an agent from either two 
types can earns half of the pie from a successful bargaining. 
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IV.2 Endogenously Determined Merger Size 
In the main model, we investigated the profitability of the horizontal merger 
in the bargaining model of R&W. We simply compared the gain in the ex-
pected payoff with different merger sizes and observed which merger size 
would maximize the profit for the merged group. Such comparison does 
not necessary imply the leading type 1 village should conduct the profit-
maximizing merger, if it is assumed that the merger size is determined en-
dogenously. If the leading type 1 village is a dictator , she conducts the 
profit-maximizing merger as stated in Proposition 1 and then sacks all the 
gain. If the gain should be split equally among the insiders of the merged 
group, the leading type 1 village may not conduct the profit-maximizing 
merger because there is a possibility that the marginal gain per insider is 
negative although the marginal gain of the merged group is positive. 
Now, we assume that the gain due to the horizontal merger is divided 
equally among the insiders. The system of equations is revised as follows: 
G1(N1 , M+ 1, N2) 
M+1 




IIf(Nl , M+ 1, N2) 
M+1 
N1 > N2 > 0, ME [0 , N1 - 1] and N~ = N1 - M. 
if N{ < N2 
(13) 
Function g1 ( N1 , M + 1, N2 ) is the per-insider share of t he gain in the 
expected joint profit from the horizontal merger with a size of (M + 1) in each 
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to ITf(Nb M+ 1, N2) and I1f0 (N1, M+ 1, N2), respectively, but in the per-
insider term. 
What we will do next is very similar to what we did in the main model. 
The profitability of the horizontal merger is investigated by comparing the 
values of the per-insider share of gain function with each possible merger size. 
We argue that the share-maximizing merger size is still the initial number of 
type 1 villages N1 . 
Proposition 2 If the initial market configuration (N1 , N2) supports prof-
itable horizontal merger( s) (positive g1 ( N1 , M + 1, N2) for several values of 
M), the share-maximizing merger size is the initial number of type 1 villages 
N1. 
The proof of Proposition 2 is an analog of that of Proposition 1. Lemma 
5 checks the convexity of the per-insider share function. Lemmas 6, 7, and 8 
describe the properties of the per-insider share function at the three special 
points: M= 0 (no merger) , M= N1 - N2 (the kink) , and M= N1 - 1 (the 
monopoly merger). Finally, two claims are made to be the backbones of the 
proposition. 
Since g1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2) is the product of G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2) and (M~l)' 
their concavity may be different. 
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{ii) if there exists a M* E (0 , N 1 - N 2) such that 9 1 (N1 , M* + 1, N2) > 0, 
91 ( N1 , M + 1, N2) is an increasing function in the interval [M* , N 1 - N 2]. 
Proof. For part (i), differentiate 91 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) twice with respect to M. 
EJg1 (N1 , M + 1, N2) (14) aM 
N2 [( - 2M+2Nl+N2+4MN1+2MN2 - N'f_ - N1N2 - 3M2)] if N1' > N2 
2 (N1 -M)2(N1-M +N2) 2(M+1) 2 ' 
N [ (2M - Nl - N2+1) ] .f N' < N 2 (N1-M+N2) 2(M+1) 2 ' l 1 2 
CJ2g1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2) (15) 
8M2 
shown in appendix, 
part ( i) is proven. 
For part (ii), consider the domain of M E [0 , N 1 - N2]. Given a M E 
[0, N 1 - N 2), the percentage change of 1rf(N1 , M+ 1, N 2) due to a unit in-




nf0 (N1 , M+ 1, N2) is a constant, and if there exists a M* E (0, N1 - N2) 
larger than g1(N1 , M'+ 1, N2) for any M' E [M*, N1 - N2) • 
It is impossible to show that the second derivative of the per-insider 
share function is positive for N{ > N2 due to the complexity of the function's 
second derivative. As a result, we take an indirect path to get enough proof to 
support the latter two claims and then the proposition. Instead of verifying if 
the per-insider share function is convex in the interval [0 , N1 - N2], we prove 
that if there is a M* E [0, N1 - N2 ) that supports a respective non-negative 
per-insider share function, another merger size M*+ 1 must generate a larger 
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share to each insider. 
Proof. Substitute M = 0 into Equations 13 and 14. • 
Lemma 7 g1(N1, N1 , N2) > 0 if and only if N1 > N:j. 
Proof. There are two ways to prove the Lemma: 
(i) By Lemma 2. 
(ii) Substitute M = N1 - 1 into Equation 13. 
(16) 
• 
Lemma 8 {i) if condition 16 holdsi > O· i 
Proof. For part (i) , substitute M = N1 - N2 into Equation 14. 
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8g1(N1 , M+ 1, N2) 
aM 
irrelevant to the proof if N{ > N2 
N [ (Nl - 3N2+1) ] 2 (2N2) 2(N1 -N2+l)2 
As condition 16 (N1 > N:j) holds, 
for N2 = 1, N1 must be larger than 1. If N1 = 2, N1 - 3N2 + 1 = 0. If 
For N 2 = 2, N1 must be larger than 4. If N1 = 5, N1 - 3N2 + 1 = 0. If 
For N 2 = 3, N1 must be larger than 9. If N1 > 10, N1 - 3N2 + 1 > 0. 
For part (ii), substitute the kink M= N 1 - N2 into Equation 13: 
Let N 1 = nN2 , and substitute it into Equation 17: 
1 1 1 1 
g1(nN2, (n -l)N2 + l , N2) = (-)(( ) ) - (-)( ). (18) 2 n - 1 N2 + 1 n n + 1 
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Set equation 18 > 0. 
(19) 
• 
The properties of the per-insider share function at the three special points 
are nearly identical to those of the gain function. Lemmas 6, 7, and 8 are 
analogs of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Although the convexity of the 
per-insider share function may be different from that of the gain function , the 
signs of these two functions given the same merger size M + 1 are the same. 
This is because the former is defined as the latter divided by the merger 
size M+ 1, which is a strictly positive function. As a result, condition 16 is 
identical to condition 6, and condition 19 is identical to condition 9. 
In the following , we make two claims to construct the proposition. 
Claim 3 If condition 16 is satisfied, the share-maximizing merger size is the 
initial number of type 1 villages N 1 . 
Proof. Lemma 6 part (i) gives g1 (N1 , 0+ 1, N2 ) = 0. Condition 16 guarantees 
G1(N1, N1 , N2) > 0 by Lemma 7, and G1(N1 , N1, N2) > G1(N1, (N1- N2) + 
1, N2) by Lemma 4 (i). If there exists a M* E (0, N1 - N2) such that 
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g1(N1,M* + 1,N2) > 0, the local maximum in the interval [O,N1 - N 2] is 
at M == N1 - N 2, by Lemma 5 part (ii). To conclude, the unique local 
maximum over all possible values of M (E [0, (N1 - 1)]) is at M== N1 - 1 . 
• 
Claim 4 If condition 16 does not hold, there is no profitable horizontal 
merger. The share-maximizing merger size is M == 0. 
Proof. Due to the convexity of the gain function 91 ( N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) , the can-
didates of the local maximum over all possible values of M ( E [0, (N1 - 1)]) 
are at M == 0, M == N 1 - N 2 and M == N1 - 1. Since condition 16 does 
not hold, the value of the gain function at M == N1 - 1 cannot be the sole 
local maximum because 91 ( N1, 0 + 1, N2) == 0 > 91 ( N1 , N1, N2). Therefore, 
by Lemma 8 (ii) , the value of the gain function at M== N1 - N2 (the kink) 
is the sole local maximum if and only if the initial number of type 1 villages 
N1 > 2(N2 - 1)N2. However, the non-existence of condition 16 implies the 
non-existence of condition 19 because N:j > 2 ( N2 -1) N2 if and only if N2 < 2. 
Moreover, for N2 == 1, N:j == 1 and 2(N2 - 1)N2 == 0, but N1 > N2 > 0. To 
conclude, M== 0 will be the only possibility to be the unique local maximum . 
• 
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IV.3 Industry Optimal Merger Size 
The prime assumption of the main models is N1 > N2 > 0. This means 
that the type of agents to conduct the merger (the type 1 agents) should be 
the relatively majority, or, in the other words, have a population larger than 
that of the rival type. Thus, there is an incentive for the leading village to 
conduct a horizontal merger. According to Propositions 1 and 2, the profit-
maximizing merger is the monopoly merger, wherein all villages of the same 
type are merged into a single identity. This is surely not optimal for the 
society of the type 1 villages. 
In this section, we consider the per-period payoff of the whole population, 
instead of the gain function of the merged group. The setting of the game is 
the same as that described in sections Ill and IV. 
min(N{ , N2)V1(N{ , N2) 
(N2) ( N1-jj+N2 )' 
N1 > N2 > 0, M E [0, N1 - 1] and N{ = N1 -M. 
0 1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2) is the payoff per period of the whole population of type 
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1 villages; Ni is the initial number of type i villages; M+ 1 is the merger size of 
the merged group; and V1 ( (N1 - M), N2 ) is function 2, the payoff that a type 
1 village can receive from a market equilibrium bargaining with after-merger 
market configuration ((N1 - M), N2). The number of successful bargaining 
that can be conducted is min( N1 , N2 ) == N2 . If the horizontal merger results 
the remaining number of type 1 villages ( N{) being larger than or equal to 
the number of type 2 villages, then N2 transactions can be conducted in 
each period. If it is smaller than N2 , the number of transactions that can 
be conducted should be N1 -M. Though a merger approaching monopoly 
can create more payoff per transaction, the number of transactions will be 
reduced if the scale of the merger is large enough. We call the function 
0 1 ( N1 , M + 1, N2 ) the industry surplus function of the type 1 villages. 
If the leading type 1 village has the right to initialize the horizontal 
merger , the scale of the merger is probably monopolistic (Proposition 2). 
The self-interest maximizing decision may cause losses to the society. 0 b-
viously, it happens in the main model because the number of bargaining 
that can be conducted in each period is reduced from N2 to 1. In the next 
proposition, we found a merger size that maximizes the payoff of the whole 
population of type 1 agents. 
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Proposition 3 The industry optimal12 merger size is M+ 1 == (N1 - N2 ) + 1 
(the kink). 
Proof. The first and second derivatives of the function 0 1 (N1 , M + 1, N2) 
are as follows: 
and 
80I(N1, M+ 1, N2) 
BM 









=-----n if Nf < N 2 (N1-M+N2) 2 ' 
2(N,-~~N2)'' if N{ > N2 
-2 N~ if Nf < N2 (N1-M+N2) 3 ' 
The population payoff function is convex increasing in the interval M E 
[0, NI- N2], but is concave decreasing in the interval M E [NI- N2, NI]· 
Therefore, M == NI - N2 is the unique local maximum. • 
Proposition 3 implies that the industry surplus maximizing merger should 
be the one that equalizes the number of agents of both types; this is the kink. 
For the portion of the industry surplus function before the kink, the reduction 
of the number of villages always induces gain in industry surplus. This is 
because the number of transactions is restricted to be N2(== min(N1 , N2)), 
12 Every market configuration is Pareto optimal because bargaining is a perfect compet-
itive (zero-sum) game. Industry optimal means the we~fare of a society is maximized, in 
which the society studied is the whole population of type 1 villages. 
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and the reduction is the only factor affecting the industry surplus. The 
industry surplus should increase because the reduction can raise the partition 
from the market equilibrium bargaining. However, if the scale of the merger 
exceeds the kink, the industry surplus should be lowered. A further increase 
in the merger size beyond the kink still increases the bargaining partition to 
the merged type, but it decreases the number of transactions that can be 
made per period. We can see that the latter effect prevails by studying the 
derivatives of the industry surplus function. In absolute value, a unit increase 
in M causes more percentage change to (NI- M) than (NI- M+ N2). The 
industry surplus must fall because the former is negative but the latter is 
positive. 
[insert Figure 3] 
Figure 3 shows the industry surplus with different merger sizes. Given 
that the initial market configuration is (NI = 100, N2 = 8), the industry 
surplus curve is convex increasing until it reaches its peak at the kink M = 92 
and then becomes concave decreasing after the kink. When the initial market 
configuration is (NI = 50, N2 = 8) , any horizontal merger is unprofitable to 
the merged group (figure 2). However, there exist a number of merger sizes 
that produce gain in industry surplus. This is also shown in Figure 3. 
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V Extensions 
V.l Two-step Sequential Merger 
In the main model, the right to conduct the horizontal merger is assigned to 
one of the two types of agents only. In this section, we release this restriction 
by assigning it to both types of agents. The process of the horizontal merger 
takes two steps. In the first step, the type 1leading village who has the right 
to start the merger decides the merger size M 1 + 1 of her merged group. In 
the second step, the type 2 leading village who has the right to exercise the 
merger chooses the merger size M 2 + 1 in response to the new number of 
· type 1 villages. After both types of agents have conducted the horizontal 
merger , the bargaining game, which is the (infinite) cycles of the matching 
and bargaining processes , begins. 
As proven in Claim 2, there is no profitable horizontal merger if condition 
6, N1 > Ni, is not satisfied. Hence, we assume the condition is satisfied in 
this section. 
Given the merger size M 1 + 1, the type 2 leading village, the second-
mover , has the incentive to merge if and only if N2 > ( N1 - M 1 ) 2 . Moreover , 
because the second-mover is also the last mover, she would choose the merger 
size that maximizes her own payoff. As a result , if the type 2 agent is willing 
to merge, the only probable merger is the monopoly merger , which generat es 
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the majority's payoff (smaller) 13 to the merged group of the type 1 agent. 
In this sense, by backward induction, if there is an incentive, the first-
mover would merge in a way that does not trigger the second-mover to con-
duct her monopoly merger. We claim the following: 
Proposition 4 There is a unzque equilibrium for the two-stage sequential 
horizontal merger zn the bargaining game gzven N 2 > 3: the first-mover 
conducts the horizontal merger with the largest possible merger size M 1 + 1 
rv 
where M 1 < N 1 - ~ and the second-mover does not merge with anyone, 
rv 
provided that such M 1 + 1 generates positive G 1 ( N 1 , M + 1, N 2 ). Otherwise, 
nobody merges. 
Proof. We assume that G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) is positive with the merger size 
rv rv 
M E [M1 , N1 - 1], where M1 < N1 - ~- If the first-mover chooses a 
merger size M1 + 1, where M1 > N1 - ~' the second-mover merges to 
be a monopoly; thus, the former earns A < ~ from a successful transaction. 
r-...J r-...J 
If the first-mover chooses a merger size M1 + 1, where M1 < N1 - ~' 
the second-mover does not merges with anyone. Obviously, the former must 
r-...J r-...J 
choose the largest possible M1 which satisfies M1 < N1 - ~; thus, earning 
B > ~ from a market equilibrium bargaining agreement. We deduce B > ~ 
r-v r-...J r-...J 
since N1 = N1 - M1 > ~- The M1 chosen shall be the largest that still 
13 It is smaller compared with the payoff after the first stage and before the second stage. 
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~ ~ ~ 
satisfies M1 < N1 - ~. Such M1 results a N1 (the remaining number of 
type 1 villages after the horizontal merger), which is just a little larger than 
~. Therefore, for N2 > 3, the smallest possible N1 must be smaller than 
N2 . Thus, we conclude B > ~ >A. 
~ 
If the largest M 1 cannot generates positive G1 (N1, M+ 1, N2 ) to the 
first-mover, since 8201 (N;:.+l,N2 ) > 0 (Lemma 1), any horizontal merger 
that produces half-half partition to the two parties also cannot give positive 
G 1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ). As a result, the first-mover does not merge, and so does 
the second-mover. • 
Proposition 4 only covers the cases where the number of type 2 villages 
is larger than 2. When N2 = 1, the first-mover would choose the monopoly 
merger if condition 6 is satisfied, as the second-mover is already a monopoly. 
When N2 = 2, condition 9 becomes deterministic in the choice of M 1 because 
the monopoly merger and the kink M1 = N1 - N2 = N1 - 2 results the 
same ITf = ~ but different rrfc. In the former case, the second-mover must 
conduct the monopoly merger since M1 = N1 -1 > N1 - ~ = N1 - ~' such 
that the resulting market configuration is (N1 ,N2 ) = (1, 1); thus, ITf = ~· 
In the latter case, the resulting market configuration is (N1 , N2 ) = (2, 2); 
thus, ITf = ~ as well. However , they give different rife: the former gives 
ITfC = (NI)(~1 )(N1~2 ), while the latter gives ITfC = (Nl- 1)(~1 )(N12+2 ). 
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The IIf0 with the monopoly merger is larger than that with the kink, as 
one more village is invited to join the merged group. Therefore, we can see 
that the kink generates more gain than the monopoly merger. Given that 
condition 6 holds, if condition 9 also holds, the profit-maximizing merger 
size is the kink as G1(N1, (N1- 2) + 1, 2) == ~- (N1- 1)(~1 )(N12+2) > ~­
(NI)(~1 )(N12+2 ) == G1(N1, N1, 2). 14 If it does not hold, nobody merges. Since 
G1(N1, (N1 - 2) + 1, 2) == ~- (N1 - 1)(~1 )(N12+2) < 0 when condition 9 does 
not hold, G1(N1 , N1,2) == ~- (N1)(~1 )(N12+2 ) < 0. 
I4 Note that condition 9 ensures positive GI (NI, (NI - 2) + 1, 2). The value of 
GI(NbNb2) is~- (NI)(~1 )(N12+2 ) instead of~- (NI)(~1 )( N12+2 ) due to the sequential 
nature of the game form, as explained in the paragraph. 
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V.2 Multiple Mergers of Common Size 
In the main model, we model the horizontal merger following the convention 
of S-S-R, which allows only one group of insiders while the others are the 
outsiders. We release this restriction in this section: we allow the existence 
of more than one insider group. At the beginning of the game, all type 1 
villages decide on a common merger size, such that each merged group after 
the horizontal merger has the same number of members. 
We let the common merger size be M = ~; , where N{ = r:; is the number 
1 
of merged group after the horizontal merger. Thus, a few equations should 





We have defined the gain in the per-period expected joint profit function of 
each merged group. Once again, we study the characteristics of this gain 
function and then find the profit maximizing common merger size. Lemma 9 
finds the concavity of the gain function; Lemmas 10, 11 , and 12 investigate 
the properties of the three special points: M= 1 (no merger) , M= ~~ (the 
kink) , and M= N1 (the monopoly merger) , respectively. 
Lemma 9 
{i) For M= {M: ~ > N2}, acl(~~M,N2) > 0 and a2clu;;,;f:1,N2) > 0; 
{ii) For M= {M: ~ < N2}, 82c1 u;};ff:1'N2) < 0. 




82G1(N1, M , N2) 
8M2 
(~n (~!) (~ + N2r3 > 0, if N{ > N2 
M3(~:~2 )2 [ M(~~N2)- 1] < 0, if N{ < N2 
Proof. Substitute M= 1 into Equation 20 and 21. • 
(22) 
Lemma 11 {i) G (N NI N) > 0 · {ii) aci(NI ,M ,N 2 ) I > 0 iff N > 1 1' N2 ' 2 ) BM N 1 M __ I 
-N2 
Proof. Substitute M = ~~ into Equation 20 and 21. 
8G1(N1, M , N2) > 0, if N{ > N2 
8M M- N I 
- N 2 
• 
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Proof. Substitute M== N 1 into Equations 20 and 21 . 
• 
Based on the lemmas given above, we propose the following: 
Proposition 5 For the unilateral common-szze horizontal merger on N1 
number of type 1 villages resulting to N{ number of merged groups with the 
same merger size of MJ 
(i) the monopoly merger is the profit-maximizing merger if N1 > N~ + 2Ni_ ; 
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{ii) the profit-maximizing common merger size is between ~~ and N1 if N1 < 
Nl + 2N:j and N1 > 3N2; 
{iii) the profit-maximizing common merger size is ~~ if N 1 < Nl + 2N:j and 
N1 < 3N2. 
Proof. By Lemma 9(i), G1 (N1 , M, N2 ) is an increasing and convex function 
when N{ > N2 ; thus, ~~ is the prevailing common merger size if it is the 
upper limit of the common merger size. Since by Lemma 9(ii) G1(N1, M, N2) 
is a concave function when N{ < N2 , the function has an inflection point at 
M == ~~ . By Lemma 12, if N1 > Nl + 2N:j, the local maximum of the gain 
function G1(N1, M , N2) is at the maximum merger size N1, as the slope of 
the gain function at it is positive. Furthermore, if N1 == N~ + 2N:j, the local 
maximum is at M== N1 . Thus, part (i) has be proven. Given N1 < N~+2N:j , 
condition N1 > 3N2 ensures a local maximum between ~~ and N1 ; thus, the 
proof of part (ii) is completed. If N1 < N~ + 2N'i and N1 < 3N2 , the portion 
of the function with M E [ ~~ , N1 J has a negative slope; thus, M = ~~ is the 
local maximum. • 
Different from the model studied in Section IV, the profit-maximizing 
merger is not restricted to be the monopoly merger if multiple numbers of 
equal-size merged groups are allowed. The kink is the profit-maximizing 
merger when the difference between the number of villages of the two types 
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is small. Mathematically, the initial number of the type 1 villages should 
be less than three times of the number of type 2 villages , so that the kink 
would prevail. The monopoly merger is the profit-maximizing merger when 
the difference is large, which means that the initial number of type 1 villages 
is larger than or equal to N1 + 2N:j. The profit-maximizing merger size is 
between the size of the monopoly merger and that of the kink when the 
difference is intermediate, which means the initial number of type 1 villages 
is between N1 + 2N:j and 3N2. 
[insert figure 4] 
[insert figure 5] 
Figures 4 and 5 are the gain functions with initial market configurations 
of (N1 = {1000, 1200, 1400}, N2 = 10). Given that the initial number of type 
2 villages is 10, the profit-maximizing merger is the monopoly merger if the 
initial number of type 1 villages is larger or equal to 1200 (= 103 + 2(102)) , 
is between ~~ and N1 if it is smaller than 1200 but larger than 30 ( = 3 x 10) , 
and is ~~ if it is smaller than 30. In Figure 5, we can see that the local 
maximizer is the monopoly merger when N1 = 1200, 1400, but it is between 
~~ and N1 when N1 = 1000. 
[insert figure 6] 
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Figure 6 shows the cases wherein the profit-maximizing common merger 
size is the kink ( ~~). It is the case when the initial number of type 1 villages 
is smaller or equal to 30. This is shown by the gain function with N1 == 20, 30. 
[insert figure 7] 
Note that villages are assumed to be perfectly divisible. If this assumption 
does not hold, the result may be different. Figure 7 shows that the monopoly 
merger becomes the profit-maximizing merger if it does not hold for the initial 
market configuration (N1 == {1000, 1200, 1400} , N2 == 10) 
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V.2.2 Endogenously Determined Merger Size 
Considering a horizontal merger results a number of merged groups with 
equal sizes; the initial market configuration determines the profit-maximizing 
merger size. In this section, we assume that the gain due to the merger is 
equally shared among the members of each group. We attempt to find the 
share-maximizing merger size the decision maker should choose, as what we 
have done in Section V.l. 
The system of equations is revised as follows: 
where 




All functions are expressed in per-member terms. 91 (NI? M, N2 ) is the 
per-member share of the gain in the expected joint profit per period subse-
quent to the horizontal merger with a common merger size M; thus , it is 
a fraction of the gain in the expected joint profit per period G1 (N1 , M, N2 ) 
over the common merger size M. 
We propose the following: 
Proposition 6 The share-maximizing common merger size is M = ~~ (the 
kink). 




'--------.... if N { > N 2 (N1 +M N2) 2 ' 
(N,+'2N2)2, if N{ < N2 
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82g1(N1 , M , N2) 
8M2 
The per-member share function is concave increasing in the interval M E 
[ 1, ~~ J but is convex decreasing in the interval M E [ ~~ , N 1 J . Therefore, 
M = ~~ is the local maximum. • 
For the common-size horizontal mergers , if the gain due to the merger 
should be equally shared among the members of each merged group, it is not 
beneficial to merge in a way that the bargaining power of the merging type 
overwhelms the opponent type. This is because the per-member share of the 
expected joint profit per period ( nf) is decreasing when the common merger 
size is beyond the kink. 
[insert figure 8] 
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V.2.3 Industry Optimal Merger Size 
The effect of the common-size horizontal merger on industry surplus is also 
investigated. The industry surplus function is revised as follows: 
0 1 (N1, M, N2 ) is the industry surplus function of the type 1 villages. If 
the remaining number of type 1 villages after the mergers is smaller or equal 
to N2 , the number of bargaining that can proceed in each period is N2 . If 
the former is larger than N2 , then the latter is ~ . 
We propose: 
Proposition 7 The industry optimal common merger size is M = ~~ (the 
kink). 
Proof. Differentiate 0 1 (N1,M,N2 ) once and twice with respect to M. 
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The industry surplus function is concave increasing in the interval M E 
[ 1, ~~ J , but is convex decreasing in the interval M E [ ~~ , N1 J . Therefore, 
M = ~~ is the local maximum. • 
Proposition 7 shows that the industry surplus is maximized at the kink. 
[insert figure 9] 
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VI Discussion 
In this paper , we studied the profitability of the horizontal merger in the 
model of bargaining and matching made by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985). 
The horizontal merger is integrated into their model as an extra stage before 
the infinite cycles of the bargaining and matching process start. Maintain-
ing the equilibriurn partition to be applicable, each agent appears in each 
cycle representing the interests of a village (or , in the other words , a sub-
population). Once an agreement is met , each agent of the pair will leave the 
market and be replaced by another from the same village. There are two 
modes in the horizontal merger: i) there is only one merger , which results 
only one merged group; and ii) there is a number of mergers , which results to 
a number of merged groups with the same merger size. Considering the case 
in which the merger size is determined outside the model (or exogenously 
determined) , the profit-maximizing merger is the monopoly merger for the 
former mode of horizontal merger given that profitable mergers exist , but 
it varies for the latter mode according to the initial market configuration. 
If the difference between the two types of agents/villages is huge, then it 
must be the monopoly merger. If the difference is small , then it is the kink, 
which equalizes the numbers of the two types of agents. If the difference 
is intermediate, the profit-maximizing common merger size is between the 
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monopoly merger and the kink. When we assume that the gain from the 
merger should be equally shared among the members of the merged group, 
the share-maximizing merger size can be considered as internally determined 
(or endogenously determined). The monopoly merger still prevails in the 
former mode, whereas the kink prevails in the latter mode. From the social 
perspective, the industry surplus of the merging types of villages is maxi-
mized by the kink for both modes. 
The results of this paper illustrate the conflict between self-interest max-
imization and industry surplus maximization. The case in which the merger 
size is determined exogenously can be interpreted as a dictator forcing a 
number of villages in the same type to join her group but providing them 
the same payoff when there is no merger. In this case, the monopoly merger , 
which is the profit-maximizing merger , is the one that maximizes the private 
interest of the leading village (the dictator). However, if the gain due to the 
merger should be shared among the insiders , the result is different. Although 
the monopoly merger is still the share-maximizing merger if only one merged 
group is allowed, the kink becomes the share-maximizing merger if multiple 
numbers of equal-sized merged groups are allowed. Nevertheless,the indus-
try surplus is maximized at the kink in both models , which allowing one or 
multiple merged groups. The monopoly merger never induces the maximum 
industry surplus. 
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The assignment of the right or the ability to conduct the horizontal merger 
determines the outcome. If it is assigned to an individual, she will probably 
extract the maximum profit by conducting the monopoly merger. If it is a 
collective decision, the prevailing merger size is the kink, which also results 
a industry optimal. For a certain extent, the models illustrate clustering 
in several examples. As discussed in the introduction, online advertising on 
small web portals is one of the significant cases. As numerous web portals 
exist in the Internet, each of them can hardly attract advertisers to place 
advertisements on it. Even if some of them are noticed, the fee is probably 
small because there are many other alternatives. Therefore, they become 
united under a number of online advertising agencies. These agencies can 
be roughly considered as the remaining villages after the horizontal merger, 
as the owner of a web portal has to surrender the right of advertising in the 
site to the online advertising agency. In the other words, a number of web 
portals surrender their individual identities and merge into a single identity, 
which is the online advertising agency. Moreover, the online advertising 
agency usually divides its collection of web portals into groups according 
to their characteristics and then approaches the potential advertisers with 
the groups of web portals matching their products. After the deduction of 
an "administration fee", the advertisement income is shared among the web 
portals in the group according to the click rate (or other similar scale) of 
67 
each individual web portal. We can assume that each web portal has more 
or less the same click rate as the others. As a result , we consider the case of 













Figure 1: Profitable Horizontal Merger ( N1 == 100, N2 == 8) 
The market structure of the above figure is N 1 == 100, N 2 == 8. The x-axis 
refers to the merger size of the horizontal merger (M == {0, ... , 99} ), and 
they-axis refers to the values of the respective functions. "pi_ C" refers to 
IIf(Nt, M+ 1, N2 ); "pi_NC" refers to rr{"c (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ); and G refers to 
G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ). Note the convexity of G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ). Some notable 
values of the function: G1 (100, 94, 8) == -0.0237, G1 (100, 95, 8) == 0.0085 , 
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Figure 2: Unprofitable Horizontal Merger (N1 ==50 , N 2 == 8) 
The market structure of the above figure is N 1 == 50 , N 2 == 8. The x-axis 
refers to the merger size of the horizontal merger (M== {0, ... , 49} ) , and the 
y-axis refers to the values of the respective functions. Note the convexity of 
non-positive over all values of M. By Claim 1 and 2: condition 6 (N1 > N:j) 
is required to ensure the possibility of positive G 1 (N1 , M+ 1, N 2 ) , but N1 == 
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Figure 3: Industry surplus under Horizontal Merger (N1 ={50, 100}, N2 = 8) 
The figure shows the industry surplus of the whole population of type 
1 villages with different merger sizes given an initial market configuration. 
The curve labelled 11 N1 = 50 11 is the industry surplus function with a number 
of 50 initial type 1 villages and 11 N1 = 100 11 is that with 100 villages. Both 
curves have the same initial number of type 2 villages: 8. They are convex 
increasing before the kink, where they reach the maximum, and then concave 
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Figure 4: Common-size Horizontal Merger 1 
The above diagram shows G1 (N1 , M , N2 ) with initial market configura-
tions of (N1 , N2 ) = {(1400, 10) , (1200, 10) , (1000, 10)}. The inflection points 
of the three curves are at M = 140, M = 120, and M = 100, respectively. 
Note that the type 1 village is assumed to be divisible in the construction of 
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Figure 5: Common-size Horizontal Merger 2 
The above diagram shows G1 (N1 , M , N 2 ) with initial market configura-
tions of (N1, N 2 ) = { (1400, 10), (1200, 10), (1000, 10) }. As N~ + 2N:j = 
1200, the monopoly merger is the profit-maximizing horizontal merger when 
the number of type 1 villages is larger than 1200. This is shown by the 
G1 (N1 ,M, N2 ) curve of N1 = 1400 and N1 = 1200. However, the monopoly 
merger is not the profit-maximizing horizontal merger when the number of 
type 1 villages is smaller than 1200. The G1 (N1 , M, N 2 ) curve of N1 = 1000 
has a local maxima between M= 905 and M= 906. Note that the type 1 












Figure 6: Common-size Horizontal Merger 3 
The above diagram shows G1 (N1, M, N2 ) with initial market configura-
tions of (N1, N2 ) = { ( 40 , 10), (30, 10) , (20, 10) }. The inflection points of the 
three curves are at M = 4, M = 3, and M = 2, respectively. 
Since N~ + 2N:j = 1200, the local maximum of G1 (40 , M , N2 ) is at 
M = 5. However , as 3N2 = 30, the point of inflection of G1 (30 , M , N2 ) 
and G1 (20 , M , N2 ) are their local maxima, respectively. Note that the type 
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Figure 7: Divisibility (N1 == {1000, 1200, 1400}, N2 == 10) 
Figure 7 is Figure 5 but without the assumption of perfect divisibility. 
Note that the monopoly merger generates maximum gain to the merged 
group for N1 == {1000, 1200, 1400} , although it is not the local maximum for 


















Figure 8: Per-member Share Function (N1 = {20, 30, 40}, N2 = 10) 
The plot above is the curves of g1 ( N1 , M , N2 ) for the initial market con-
figurations N1 = {20, 30, 40} , N2 = 10. We can see that all the curves reach 
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Figure 9: Industry surplus under Common-size Horizontal Merger (N1 
{20, 30, 40} , N2 = 10) 
The figure shows the industry surplus of all type 1 villages under a 
common-size horizontal merger. The local maxima of all curves is at the 
kink ~~. 
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A.2 Mathematical Proof in Detail 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
The first derivative of G1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) with respect to M is 
8G1(N1 ,M+1,N2) _ 
BM 
-Ni[(N1-M+N2)( -1)+( -1)(N1-M)] 
(N1-M+N2)2(N1-M)2 
N2( -1)( -1) Ni "f N' N 
(N1-M+N2)2 N1(N1 +N2)' 1 1 < 2 
The second derivative of G1 (NI? M+ 1, N2 ) with respect to M is 
Let A= N1- M+ N2, B = N1- M, C = -2M + 2N1 + N 2 . 
82Gl(Nl ,M+1 ,N2) I 
8M2 N1-M?:.N2 
_ N.2 [A2B 2(-2)-[A2(2)B(-1)+(2)A(-1)B2}c] 
- 2 A4B4 
- N2 [AB[-2AB+(2A+2B)C]] 
- 2 A4B4 
- N2 [-2AB+2AC+2BCJ 
- 2 A3B3 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
For part (i) , substitute M= 0 into Equation 3. 
Since M= 0; thus N 1 - M= N 1 - 0 > N2. Hence, 
For part (ii), substitute M= 0 into Equation 4: 
8Gl(Nl ,M+1 ,N2) I 
BM M=O 
- N2 [ 2Nl +N2 - 1 ] 
- 2 (N1 +N2) 2(N1) 2 N1 (N1 +N2) 
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_ N.2 [N1(2-N1)+N2(l-N1)] 
- 2 N'f(N1 +N2) 2 . 
Since N1 > N2 > 0, N1 is at least 2; thus, BG1(N1,M+I,N2) I < 0. 
BM M=O 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
Substitute M == N1 - 1 into Equation 3. 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
For part (i), substitute M== N1 - N2 into Equation 4. 
N2 [ (N,-~+N2)2 - N,(:,~N2)] IM=N,-N2 
= N2 [[N,-(N, !N2)+N2]2 - N,(:,~N2)] 
- N [ 1 N2 ] - N [N1(N1 +N2)-Ni] 
-
2 NI - N1(N1 +N2) - 2 N1N:j(N1 +N2) 
For part (ii), substitute the kink M== N 1 - N 2 into Equation 3. 
Proof of Lemma 5: 
For part (i), the second derivative of g1 (N1 , M+ 1, N 2 ) is 
8 2g1(N1,M+l,N2) I 
8M2 N'>N 1- 2 
== 2N2 [(N1-M)(N1-M+N2)(M+l)(2N1 -3M+N2-l)+ ( -2M+2N1 +N2+4MN1 +2MN2-Nf_-N1N2-3M
2) 2] 
2 (N1-M) (N1-M+N2) (M+l) 
82g1(N1,M+l,N2) I 
8M2 N' N 
1< 2 
_ 8 (N (2M-N1-N2+l) ) 
- BM 2 (N1-M+N2)2(M+l) 2 
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- N [(Nl-M+N2)2(M+1)2(2)- ( (Nl-M +N2) 2(2)(M +1)+(2)(Nl - M+N2)( - l)(M+1)2)(2M -Nl-N2+1) ] 
-
2 (N1 - M+N2) 4 (M+l) 4 
== 2N
2 








For part (ii), given an ME [0, N1 - N2 ), an unit increase in such M gives 
the following: 
1rf(N1, (M+ 1) + 1, N2) 
( N,-(~+1)) (N,-(:~1)+N2) CM+\)+1) 
(N,~k-1) (N,-:~N2-1) (M~2). 
c -Therefore, the percentage change of 1r1 (N1 , M+ 1, N2 ) due to a unit 
increase in M is as follows: 
%6n f (N1 ,M+ l ,N2) I 
6 M 6M=l 
_ n f (N1 ,( M+l )+l ,N2)-nf (N1 ,M + l ,N2) 
n f (N1 ,M +l ,N2) 
follows: 
The derivatives used are as follows: 
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with respect to M IS as 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
For part (i), substitute M= 0 into Equation 13. 
For part (ii), substitute M= 0 into Equation 14. 
8gl(Nl ,M+1 ,N2) I 
8M M=O 
_ N.2 ( -2(0)+2Nl +N2+4(0)Nl +2(0)N2-Nf-N1N2-3(0) 2)] 
- 2 (N1-(0)) 2 (N1-(0)+N2) 2((0)+1) 2 
= N.
2




.Since N > N > 0 N is at least 2 891 (Nl ,M+1,N2) I < 0 1 2 , 1 ' 8M 
M=O 
Proof of Lemma 7: 
Substitution of M = N1 - 1 into Equation 13 gives the following: 
= ( N~!1) ( ~1) - ( ~~) ( Nt1+2N2) 
= (~~)(N21+1)- (~~)(N1:2N2) 
Proof of Lemma 8: 
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For part (i), substitute M == N1 - N2 into Equation 14. 
irrelevant to the proof 
N [ (2(Nl-N2)-Nl-N2+1) ] "f N' < N 2 (N1 -(N1 -N2)+N2) 2 ((N1 -N2)+l)2 1 1 2 
For part (ii), substitute the kink M== N1 - N2 into Equation 13. 
== ( N1-(N:'-2N2)+N2) ( (N1-~2)+l) - ( ~~) ( N1:2N2) 
== ( ~2) ( N1-~2+l) - ( ~~) ( N~2N2) 
Proof of Lemma 9: 
The first and the second derivatives of the revised G1 (N1 , M, N2 ) with 
respect to M are as follows: 
82G1 (N1 ,M,N2) 
8M2 
Proof of Lemma 10: 
( NNi1 ) [M ( ~ ) + 1 1 ] (~+N2 ) 2 ~+N2 - N1+N2 
Substitute M == 1 into Equations 20 and 21. 
G1(N1> 1, Nz) = (~~) (N::2NJ- (1) (~~) (N,~N2 ) = 0 
&G,(~~M,N2) IM=l = (~D [(~~:;:)2 - N,!N2 ] > 0 
Proof of Lemma 11: 
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Substitute M= ~~ into Equations 20 and 21. 
G1(N1 , ~~,N2) 
( ~~) ( N~2N2 ) - ( ~~) ( ~~) ( N1:2N2) if N~ > N2 
( N ~2N 2 ) - ( ~ ~ ) ( ~ ~ ) ( N 1:2N 2 ) 
= ~- (N~2N2) > Q 
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